Stody+games

Budapest, 6-7 October 2021

The aim of Stody+games, the Meeting on Games, Stochastics, and Dynamics is to bring together researchers who work on mathematical questions related to stochastic and dynamic features of games and to facilitate discussions and collaborations on this area. The meeting will include several talks and a poster session.

The workshop is co-hosted with Corvinus Center for Operations Research, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies, GAMENET, and Games Research Group Tel-Aviv University

Date: Wednesday+Thursday, 6+7 October 2021
Location: Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Building E, Room 2001

Kóczy’s paper in Games

The paper titled Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union discusses the impact of Brexit on voting in the Council of the European Union. There is a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases the largest members’ powers while decreasing the smallest ones’ powers. 

The paper is freely downloadable.

Somogyi’s paper in the International Journal of Industrial Organization

The paper “Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet” by Robert Somogyi (joint with Axel Gautier) has been published recently in the International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Click here for free access to the article until Nov 15th.

The authors compare two business practices on the mobile internet market, paid prioritization and zero-rating. These practices are tools for the internet service provider (ISP) to alter competition on the content market. Both violate the principle of net neutrality, but the paper shows that their effects on consumer welfare are fairly different. In particular, it finds that a policy banning prioritization (a policy currently followed by the EU and also the US until 2016) can lead to zero-rating (if allowed) and a reduction in consumer surplus. Finally, the paper also shows that despite the fears of net neutrality advocates about excluding lawful content, the ISP can extract more surplus from consumers by privileging the relatively weaker content, at least when asymmetry between content types is limited.