June 5: Leonardo Madio (QSMS Seminar)

Leonardo Madio (University of Padova) will present the paper “Design and Governance of Quality on a Digital Platform” on June 5th, 2024, at 3:00 PM, in room QA406.

Abstract:   

This paper studies the incentives of a platform to curate quality of third- party products it hosts. There are two types of sellers. “Normal sellers” have heterogeneous intrinsic quality and can enhance their quality through effort. Bad sellers have zero quality and never exert effort. Quality is unobserved to consumers who rely on a rating system to form beliefs on product quality. We show that the platform may intentionally host bad sellers to induce more effort by normal sellers, even if it can identify and block bad sellers at zero cost. We also show that a social planner might also want to have some bad sellers on board. Moreover, tolerating bad sellers can also be a more effective tool to induce more effort than making the rating system more stringent.

May 22: Kevin Techer (QSMS Seminar)

Kevin Techer (University Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne) will present the paper “Hazardous waste transportation: a cost allocation analysis” on May 22nd, 2024, at 10:30 AM, in room QA406.

Abstract:   

This paper studies hazardous waste transportation problems. Due to their dangerous nature, the transportation of such waste implies a risk of incident having irreversible consequences on the environment. This problem has lead to a body of legal statutes that monitor the generation, storage and transportation of hazardous waste. Assuming that the transport of hazardous waste is done in a cooperative manner on a transport network, this paper investigates how to share the cost of maintaining such network among the involved agents. We analyze the hazardous transportation problem from the viewpoint of axiomatic analysis. We consider several axioms that are interpreted through different environmental law principles and provide a characterization of a new allocation rule: the responsibility rule. Then we show that the responsibility rule coincides with the multi-choice Shapley value of an appropriate multi-choice game.

May 8: Artem Razumovskii (QSMS Seminar)

Artem Razumovskii (CERGE-EI) will present the paper “Interim Deadline for Procrastinators” on May 8th, 2024, at 10:30 AM, in room QA406.

Abstract:   

People are partially time inconsistent and many have difficulties committing to a detailed schedule for a project. I study optimal interim deadlines and how they affect the behavior and resulting welfare of the present-biased agent. I consider a model in which there are three types of agent in terms of how the agent understands her present bias: naive, sophisticated, and partially-sophisticated. For each type, there is a unique design for an exogenous interim deadline that maximizes the agent’s welfare. However, only the sophisticated agent would self-impose an optimal interim deadline, while the naïve agent would not apply a self-imposed deadline at all. The partially-sophisticated agent sets a nonoptimal self-imposed deadline and can even decrease her own welfare by imposing it. The main result is that the partially-sophisticated agent who is relatively less present-biased would decrease her own welfare by using a self-imposed deadline, and the partially-sophisticated agent who is relatively more present-biased would increase her welfare given the same degree of sophistication.

May 13: Jinglei Huang (QSMS Seminar)

Jinglei Huang (Tsinghua University) will present the paper “The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided Platform Game ” on May 13th at 10:30 AM online.

MS Teams (click here to join) (Meeting ID: 389 673 827 294 Passcode: pezarH)

Abstract:   

The paper introduces a new coalitional game with transferable utility — called a two-sided platform game. The participation of the platform user on one side benefits the other side, and the platform can be established if and only if there is more than one entrepreneur. Well-known point solutions and set solutions are investigated. It turns out that the kernel and the nucleolus coincide, and both the Shapley value and the nucleolus have simple expressions. The paper sheds light on platforms and antitrust issues. When there is more than one platform entrepreneur, the utility share of each entrepreneur is relatively low in both point solutions.