Szilvia Papai (Concordia University) will present her paper “Fair Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Preference“ (co-authored with Shahidul Islam) on May 30th at 2:30 PM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (email@example.com) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (firstname.lastname@example.org).
In a many-to-one matching problem children have dichotomous preferences over daycares, and daycares have strict priorities over children. Given the limited enrolment capacity of daycares, the main objective is to ﬁnd a matching mechanism that is fair for children (i.e., does not violate the daycare priorities) and maximizes the number of matched children. We identify a class of mechanisms that are fair and always lead to a maximum matching. We also show that these mechanisms are strategyproof for the children.