Presenting “Narrative adoption and strategic timing of disclosure?” at 16:00-17:30 online: Click here to join the meeting
On 23 February 2022, we have Maya Jalloul of Lebanese American University visiting us. She is going to give a seminar on “Narrative adoption and strategic timing of disclosure.” at 16:00 online Click here to join the meeting. Please help the organisers by registering in advance at email@example.com Registration is free. Event can only be attended with vaccination card.
Abstract: This paper investigates a model with two strategic politicians, a proponent and an opponent, and a group of non-strategic voters. The proponent, who is the first mover, has a narrative that she aims to convey to the voters; whereas the opponent’s objective is to divert the voters away from it. The strategic decision of the proponent is when to disclose her narrative with the objective to maximise the adoption of this narrative by a deadline, and that of the opponent is when to disclose the refutation. The voters opinions updating rule follows an average-based De Groot learning concept where a voter splits his attention between the two politicians, his own opinion and his neighbours. We show that once the proponent discloses her narrative, it is optimal for the opponent to disclose her refutation, and that the proponent faces a trade-off between early and late disclosure. We determine the optimal timing of disclosure for the cases of one voter and a group of voters and we examine connections among voters over a specific set of networks, while considering two types of voters, supporters and non-supporters. We also investigate the impact of homophily on timing of disclosure and we find that with higher homophily, the narrative adoption of the supporter is higher and that of the non-supporter is lower.
Presenting “Can Media Pluralism Be Harmful to News Quality?” at 16:00-17:30 QA 406
On 22 February 2022, we have Chistopher P. Stapenhurst of University of Edinburgh visiting us. He is going to give a seminar on “Lemons by design: sowing secrets that curb corruption” (with Andrew Clausen) at 16:00 in room QA406. Please help the organisers by registering in advance at firstname.lastname@example.org Registration is free. Event can only be attended with vaccination card.
Abstract: We study a problem in which a polluting firm can bribe an inspector to conceal evidence of illegal behaviour. We find that the best way to deter bribes involves paying secret rewards and sending secret clues. The regulator promises to pay a secret reward to either the firm or the inspector when evidence is reported; it then gives them different clues about who will be rewarded. These clues are carefully constructed to engineer the worst possible lemons problem in the market for concealment: each player only wants to conceal evidence if they believe that the other player is more optimistic about being rewarded. But they cannot both be more optimistic in equilibrium, so no concealment takes place. As well as deterring bribes cheaply, this scheme demonstrates the full extent of contagious adverse selection in a bilateral trade environment.
Kóczy’s paper titled “Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council” (joint work with Dóra Gréta Petróczy and Mark Francis Rogers) has been published in Games.
Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. This paper studies the effects of an additional exit on the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Power indices of the member states are studied both with and without the country which might leave the union. Results show a pattern connected to a change in the number of states required to meet the 55% threshold. An exit that modifies this number benefits the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small member states. According to the calculations, only the exit of Poland would be supported by the qualified majority of the Council.
Petróczy, D.G.; Rogers, M.F.; Kóczy, L.Á. Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council. Games 2022, 13, 18. https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010018
Presenting “Can Media Pluralism Be Harmful to News Quality?” at 16:00-17:30 online Click here to join the meeting
On 9 February 2022, we have Federico Innocenti of University of Mannheim visiting us. He is going to give a seminar on “Can Media Pluralism Be Harmful to News Quality?” at 16:00 online Click here to join the meeting. Please help the organisers by registering in advance at email@example.com Registration is free. Event can only be attended with vaccination card.
Abstract: I study a Bayesian persuasion model that connects two stylized facts characterizing the Internet: a great diversity of news sources and the proliferation of disinformation. I show that competition between news sources with opposite biases reduces information quality when news consumers have limited attention because of the endogenous formation of echo chambers. According to the standard narrative, echo chambers arise because news consumers exhibit confirmation bias. I show that even unbiased and rational news consumers devote their limited attention to like-minded news sources in equilibrium. Confirmation bias thus arises endogenously because news sources have no incentive to provide valuable information.
Arseniy Samsonov presented his paper How can social media limit disinformation? in the prestigious seminar series of the Institute of Analytical Sociology of Linköping University on 3 February.
Presenting “Polarization and Policy Design” at 16:00-17:30 in QA406.
On 8 February 2022, we have Giovanni Andreottola of University of Naples visiting us. He is going to give a seminar on “Polarization and Policy Design” at 16:00 in room A406 in Building Q, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Magyar tudósok körútja 2, 1117 Budapest. Please help the organisers by registering in advance at firstname.lastname@example.org Registration is free. Event can only be attended with vaccination card.
Abstract: Voters in the U.S. and elsewhere have become highly polarized. How does this impact policymaking? We build a model to examine this question in the context of distributive politics and find that polarization can have a non-monotonic effect on equity. Political turnover and the inter-temporal resolution of policy uncertainty play key roles for this result. The implications of alternative electoral systems are also examined: contrary to conventional
wisdom, proportional systems may exacerbate partisan policymaking compared to majoritarian systems.