Category: Seminar

Marieke Pahlke  (Institute of Operations and Decision Sciences, Corvinus University) will present his paper on “Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Dutch Auctions” on November 27th at 11:00 AM, room QA406.

Abstract:   

We study a decreasing price auction with an ambiguity-neutral seller and two ambiguity-averse buyers. Due to the dynamic structure, buyers learn about the valuation of the opponent buyer during the auction. We characterize a belief formation process that allows buyers to consider their knowledge of the information structure. This process leads to a rectangular ex-ante belief set and implies dynamically consistent behavior. Then, we show that the seller can extract almost all surplus even if buyers behave dynamically consistently. Further, in our setting, buyers accept higher prices compared to a consistent planning approach.

Anastas Tenev  (Institute of Economics, Corvinus University) will present his paper on “Directed Reciprocity Subverts Altruism in Highly Adaptive Populations” on November 20th at 11:00 AM, room QA406.

Abstract:   

Directed reciprocity is generally considered to be a powerful driver for cooperation. Using extensive simulations within an established stylized framework, we test the strength of this relationship. We confirm that directed reciprocity boosts cooperation, but only in the case of relatively inert populations. For highly adaptive populations we find the opposite: directed reciprocity impedes cooperation. 

Rafael Treibich   (University of Southern Denmark) will present his paper “Repeated Majority Voting“ (co-authored with A. Macé) on June 16th at 10:00 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

The theory of repeated games offers a compelling rationale for cooperation in a variety of environments. Yet, its consequences for collective decision-making have been largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and show how repetition may reduce the inefficiency of majority voting. In turn, this affects the comparison of majority rules, which may differ significantly relative to the static setting. The model provides a rationale for the use of supermajority rules, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committee voting. 

Szilvia Papai  (Concordia University) will present her paper “Fair Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Preference“ (co-authored with Shahidul Islam) on May 30th at 2:30 PM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

In a many-to-one matching problem children have dichotomous preferences over daycares, and daycares have strict priorities over children. Given the limited enrolment capacity of daycares, the main objective is to find a matching mechanism that is fair for children (i.e., does not violate the daycare priorities) and maximizes the number of matched children. We identify a class of mechanisms that are fair and always lead to a maximum matching. We also show that these mechanisms are strategyproof for the children. 

Anastasia Leontiou  (University of Ioannina) will present her job market paper “Tacit bundling among rivals: Limited availability bargains to loss-averse consumers“ (co-authored with N. Ziros) on March 24th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

The current paper addresses a mechanism that encourages the bundle consumption of two substitute goods in a partially differentiated duopoly. Assuming consumer loss aversion à la ‎Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), we develop a bait-and-switch model, where a seller offers a discount in limited availability to attract consumers’ interest and increase their willingness to pay when the discount is not available to avoid the disappointment of leaving the store empty-handed. Due to market competition, such stochastic pricing is effective only when it induces the joint purchase of the products and consumers end up buying both products. As a result, this bait-and-switch strategy creates conditions for collusion between the rival firms as they achieve bundle scheme sales at high component prices without any explicit agreement. Hence, our results shed light on bait-and-switch practices that might require additional, well-designed policies. 

Héctor Hermida-Rivera  (University of East Anglia) will present his job market paper “Stable Voting Rules“ on March 20th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

This paper introduces a flexible notion of stability for voting rules that can be used with any equilibrium concept. Theorem 1 shows that if players’ utility function satisfies four natural axioms, a voting rule is stable in Nash equilibria if and only if it has a unique minimal winning coalition. Theorem 2 shows that under the same four axioms, the set of stable voting rules in undominated Nash equilibria contains the set of voting rules with a unique minimal winning coalition and is contained in the set of voting rules with non-empty intersection of minimal winning coalitions. Finally, Theorems 3 to 6 rely on these results to partially characterise the set of self-stable constitutions, where a constitution is a pair of voting rules: an ordinary one for routine issues, and an extraordinary one for amendments.

Luca Sandrini (Research Center of QSMS, BME) will present: “Protecting secrets with organizational innovations “ on March 14th at 2:30 PM, room QA 406.

Abstract:   

I propose a theory of the determinants of organizational innovation which considers it as a device to lower workers’ autonomy in the production process and their ability to collect information about it. In particular, I show that firms may have incentives to increase their control over the workforce to limit spillovers of potentially valuable information if they cannot limit workers’ mobility. I design a theoretical model where firms decide how to organize the workforce to reach a target level of productivity. I assume workers’ effort increases productivity at the organizational level, but it may reduce workers learning if excessive. When firms face the threat of information spillovers regarding their secrets, they are keener to intensify control over the workforce to limit it. From a policy perspective, I show banning laws restricting workers’ mobility might be an incomplete policy, as companies would find alternative mechanisms other than legal protections to defend against appropriation. 

Maxim Senkov (CERGE-EI Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education – Economics Institute) will present his job market paper “Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade“ on March 10th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the principal. If the project is sufficiently promising ex ante, then the agent commits to providing only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough ex ante, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good news but also the bad news that a project milestone has not been reached by an interim deadline. I demonstrate that the outlined structure of optimal information disclosure holds irrespective of the agent’s profit share, benefit from the flow of funding, and the common discount rate. 

Andrei Kalk (University of Vienna) will present his paper “Environmental policy under political pressure “ on March 7th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov(samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

Climate change poses major challenges for governments around the world
because the transition from a traditional economy to a carbon-neutral
one must take place rapidly if tipping points are not to be exceeded. A
particularly important aspect of this transition is that it necessarily
creates economic winners and losers. Individual companies or entire
industries that are dependent on the use of fossil fuels lose part of
their business basis, while other industries benefit immensely from the
transition to CO2 neutrality. This situation creates a favorable
breeding ground for lobbying and other forms of political influence. The
present paper is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of this
problem. 

Martin Obradovits (University of Innsbruck) will present his Job Market Paper “Competition with List Prices“ on February 10th at 10 AM, room QA 406 (note the room change). One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov(samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

Retail prices in stores are often lower than widely advertised list prices. We study the competitive role of such list prices in a homogeneous product duopoly where firms first set list prices before setting possibly reduced retail prices. Building on Varian (1980), we assume that some consumers observe no prices, some observe all prices, and some only observe the more salient list prices. We show that when the latter group chooses myopically, firms’ ability to use list prices lowers average transaction prices. This effect is weakened when these consumers are rational. The possibility to use list prices facilitates collusion.