Presenting 40 years of Tax Evasion Games: A Meta-Analysis at 12:15-13:30 in QA406.
On 2nd April 2019 we have Antoine Malezieux of University of Exeter visiting us. He is going to give a seminar titled 40 years of Tax Evasion Games: A Meta-Analysis at 12:15-13:30 in room A406 in Building Q, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Magyar tudósok körútja 2, 1117 Budapest. Sandwiches will be provided. Please register. Also see our Facebook event.
Abstract: We collect data from 64 papers that use laboratory experiments to examine individual tax evasion behavior (or Tax Evasion Games), in order to use meta-analysis to estimate the impacts of various policy instruments on the extensive and intensive margins of tax evasion behavior. Our results show that the audit probability has a positive impact on the extensive margin, unlike the tax rate, a tax amnesty, or a at tax system. We also nd that the audit probability and the tax rate have a negative impact on the intensive margin, while the ne
rate has a positive impact. Finally, we nd that only one endogenous audit rule performs better than a random audit rule, suggesting that random audits cannot be said in general to perform better or worse than non-random audits.