Presenting Competitive Equilibria in Shapley-Scarf Markets with Coalitional Trade at 12:15-13:30 in QA406.
On 3rd April 2019 we have Fatma Aslan of CNAM (Paris) and Istanbul Bilgi University visiting us. She is going to give a seminar titled Competitive Equilibria in Shapley-Scarf Markets with Coalitional Trade at 12:15-13:30 in room A406 in Building Q, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Magyar tudósok körútja 2, 1117 Budapest. Sandwiches will be provided. Please register. Also see our Facebook event.
Abstract: We investigate the existence and properties of several types of competitive equilibrium in generalized Shapley-Scarf markets where trades are organized among exogeneous coalitions. Coalitional trade generates externalities in individual valuations of allocations. Equilibrium concepts differ according to the definition of the budget constraint of coalitions, and to the type of cooperation prevailing among partners. We show that both existence and properties of equilibria crucially depend on the properties of individual preferences. We also derive maximal preference domains for the existence of two specific types of equilibrium.