Category: Seminar

Myrto Kasioumi (QSMS) will present “The Influence of Social Practices on the Environment” on March 16th, 2026, at 10:30 AM, in room QA323.

Abstract:

This paper examines how changes in everyday social practices relate to air quality in the United States, using the COVID-19 pandemic as a large, unplanned behavioral shock during which human mobility was substantially reduced. Focusing on three major air pollutants—NO2, PM10, and PM2.5—and employing a set of panel econometric models, the study estimates both the short-run and long-term environmental consequences of reduced traffic activity. Two complementary forecasting exercises, including a counterfactual no-COVID-19 scenario and a hypothetical case in which COVID-like mobility patterns persisted beyond the pandemic, are used to explore how air pollution would have evolved under alternative behavioral regimes.

By explicitly examining the persistence of air quality improvements, the paper contributes to ongoing discussions on the environmental relevance of temporary behavioral change, an underexplored dimension in the existing literature. The results indicate that mobility reductions are associated with short-run improvements in air quality, particularly for NO2, but that these improvements dissipate as behavior returns to normal, highlighting the limits of short-term behavioral change in achieving lasting environmental gains without accompanying structural transformations.

Héctor Hermida Rivera (QSMS) will present “Self-Equivalent Voting Rules” on March 2nd, 2026, at 10:30 AM, in room QA323.

Abstract:

In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, the unique voting rule satisfying the democratic principles of anonymity, optimality, monotonicity, and neutrality as well as the stability principle of self-equivalence must assign to every voter equal probability of being a dictator (i.e., uniform random dictatorship). Thus, any society that desires stability and adheres to the aforementioned democratic principles is bound to either employ the uniform random dictatorship or decide whether to change its voting rule using a voting rule other than itself.

Soumyanetra Munshi (Indian Statistical Institute) will present “Lobbying and Enforcement: An Economic Exploration” on May 26th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405.

Abstract:

The government allocates resources to its various departments, one of which is supposed to enforce law on another. The non-enforcing department works in close proximity with an industry that is organised into a lobby and gives campaign contributions to the representatives of the ruling party forming the government. Moreover, the enforcement department utilises the government funds to improve its enforcement mechanism to detect violations in the non-enforcing department. Under such interdependencies and interactions, this paper presents a theoretical framework to study the effect that lobbying and enforcement have on the allocation of resource. Lobbying shifts the marginal benefit of the non-lobby group, whereas enforcement changes the very nature of marginal benefits of both the groups. Enforcement, without lobbying, substantially distorts allocation away from the non-enforcing group, whereas lobbying is somewhat able to check that distortion.

Evgeniya Dubinina (Charles University) will present “Online Cash Register Policy in Russia: Impact on Firm Profits and Exit Decisions” on May 19th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405.

Abstract:

To improve tax compliance, the Russian government required small firms to use online cash registers (OCRs) for business-to-consumer transactions from 2017. While OCR policy aims to increase transparency, the implementation of OCRs raises fixed costs for small and middle firms, potentially driving them to adopt various coping strategies, such as shifting to the shadow economy, exiting the market, underreporting profits, overstating costs, or a combination of these. Using the TWFE and Regression Discontinuity in Time techniques, I estimate the effects of the OCR policy on reported profits, profits tax, and firms’ exit decisions. Exogenous variation for causal inference is possible thanks to different years of policy implementation (2017, 2018, 2019). I find that tax revenues increased. However, the effects vary by tax regime, with no significant revenue changes for some. Furthermore, the number of firms declined following the policy’s implementation.

Radostina Shopova (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Economic Research Institute) will present “Vertical Integration in Platforms: Two-sided Monetization and Commitments” on April 28th, 2025, at 2:00 PM, in room QA407.

Abstract:

Digital platforms have gained substantial market power through network effects and seek to expand further, sometimes by vertically integrating with producers to gain control over their products. The EU’s Digital Markets Act closely monitors such mergers to prevent market exclusion and reduced innovation. This paper models vertical integration in digital platforms, incorporating two key aspects: 1) platforms’ two-sided monetization, collecting commissions from sellers and charging access fees to consumers, and 2) the repeated nature of interactions between parties. Post-merger, to build a larger consumer base, the platform may commit to marginal cost pricing or price the integrated product below cost if demand diversion strengthens with higher prices. This creates a stronger margin squeeze for outside sellers, even though the platform reduces commissions. Still, if sellers offer highly differentiated products, they may gain from the larger consumer base. However, the likelihood of third-party sellers profiting decreases in markets with many participants and weak outside options for consumers.

Feifei Xu (Corvinus University) will present “The Impact of Socioeconomic Status, Mental Health Outcomes and COVID-19 Factors on Health-Related Quality of Life in Elderly Adults” on April 25th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405.

Abstract:

This study examines the influence of socioeconomic factors, mental health outcomes, and COVID-19-related experiences on the health-related quality of life (HRQoL) of older Hungarian adults. Specifically, it explores the direct and indirect effects of socioeconomic status (SES) and COVID-19-related factors on HRQoL, with mental health outcomes acting as a mediator. A cross-sectional survey was conducted from May 25 to June 8, 2021, involving 398 participants aged 65 and older. Self-reported measures included the Visual Analog Scale (VAS) for HRQoL, Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) for anxiety, and Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) for depression. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to analyze relationships between HRQoL and key predictors, with mental health outcomes examined as a mediator. SEM analysis revealed that gender was significantly associated with HRQoL, with females reporting higher HRQoL than males. SES factors were not direct predictors of HRQoL, but depressive symptoms strongly influenced HRQoL, while anxiety symptoms showed no significant association. COVID-19-related factors, particularly infection severity and quarantine status, significantly impacted HRQoL. These findings highlight the critical role of mental health as a mediator between SES, COVID-19-related factors, and HRQoL, emphasizing the need for targeted mental health interventions to support older adults.

Ina Taneva (University of Edinburgh) will present “Strategic Ignorance and Information Design” (with Tom Wiseman) on April 14th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405.

Abstract:

We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly refuse to view their private signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to view their signals may lead to substantial divergence between the designer’s intent and actual outcomes, even in the case where the designer seeks to maximize the agents’ payoffs. We introduce the appropriate equilibrium concept — ignorance-permissive Bayes correlated equilibrium — and characterize implementable distributions over states and actions. The designer’s optimal response to strategic ignorance generates qualitative properties that standard information design cannot: the designer may provide redundant or even counterproductive information, asymmetric information structures may be strictly optimal in symmetric environments, providing information conditional on players’ viewing choices rather than all at once may hurt the designer, and communication between players may help her. Optimality sometimes requires that players ignore their signals with positive probability.

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Gabriel Ziegler (University of Edinburgh) will present “Bounded Reasoning and Rationalizability” on April 4th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405.

Abstract:

We examine the connections between bounded reasoning approaches in game theory—such as level-k and cognitive hierarchy models—using tools from epistemic game theory. We demonstrate that these classic models are subsumed by an overarching ∆-rationalizability framework, in which the ∆ restriction transparently constrains the first-order beliefs of bounded types only, thereby clarifying how agents reason. Our formalization retains the standard behavioral predictions of level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, while avoiding reliance on an exogenous bound on iterative reasoning. By substituting arbitrary iterative assumptions with precise belief restrictions, we provide a unified and transparent foundation for analyzing bounded rationality. These insights extend in a much more delicate way to dynamic settings, where we further explore a novel role of epistemic priority in such contexts.

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Somogyi Róbert (Department of Finance) will present “Deceptive Counterfeits and Consumer Protection” (with Johannes Johnen and Gianmarco Luu) on March 28th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405.

Abstract:

Deceptive counterfeits—fake products that closely mimic originals in price and appearance—are a growing concern in e-commerce, posing risks to consumers and brands. Dangerous examples include fake pharmaceuticals, electronics, and car parts that can cause serious harm. This paper develops a theoretical model to examine digital platforms’ incentives to combat such fakes. We compare two enforcement strategies: prosecuting counterfeit sellers and consumer information campaigns. While seller prosecution consistently benefits consumers, information campaigns can have unintended consequences, sometimes increasing counterfeit purchases due to price adjustments by fake sellers. Our findings provide insights into the challenges of protecting consumers in digital marketplaces.

Siting (Estee) Lu (University of Edinburgh) will present “Costly Job Search with Inattentive Workers” on March 27th, 2025, at 3:00 PM (CET) via Microsoft Teams.

Join the seminar: Meeting Link

Abstract:

Labour market mismatch can arise from workers having limited attention. I propose a Generalized Partially Directed Search model, extending on existing literature by allowing inattentive workers to have diverse priors and heterogeneous attention costs. I show that mismatch can be inherited from bias in workers’ default search strategies, and heterogeneous attention costs could contribute to greater variability in the equilibrium outcomes. I also explore equilibrium multiplicity that was not adequately analyzed in previous studies. Equilibria where workers adopt different application strategies may generate both higher market efficiency and lower monopsony power than when workers employ the same application strategies. This information-theoretic approach to model job search offers new policy insights on the basis of attention.