News
László Á. Kóczy presented his paper Network Disruptions and the Security of Supply in the European Gas Network (joint with Dávid Csercsik and Balázs Sziklai) at the 2020/21 Conference of the Commodity and Energy Markets Association (virtually) at the Universidad Carlos III, 17-18 June 2021.
Robert Somogyi will present his paper at the Oligo Workshop 2021, organized by Maastricht University, held virtually on June 4 and 5.
In the paper titled The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games (co-authored with P. Jean-Jacques Herings) published in Games and Economic Behavior, the equivalence of two dynamic cooperative game theoretic concepts, the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set is studied and the modifications needed for equivalence are presented.
The paper is freely downloadable from the publisher’s site.
The paper “Scarce and directly beneficial reputations support cooperation” by Szabolcs Számadó (joint with Flóra Samu and Károly Takács) has been published recently in Scientific Reports.
A human solution to the problem of cooperation is the maintenance of informal reputation hierarchies. Reputational information contributes to cooperation by providing guidelines about previous group-beneficial or free-rider behaviour in social dilemma interactions. How reputation information could be credible, however, remains a puzzle. We test two potential safeguards to ensure credibility: (i) reputation is a scarce resource and (ii) it is not earned for direct benefits. We test these solutions in a laboratory experiment in which participants played two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma games without partner selection, could observe some other interactions, and could communicate reputational information about possible opponents to each other. Reputational information clearly influenced cooperation decisions. Although cooperation was not sustained at a high level in any of the conditions, the possibility of exchanging third-party information was able to temporarily increase the level of strategic cooperation when reputation was a scarce resource and reputational scores were directly translated into monetary benefits. We found that competition for monetary rewards or unrestricted non-monetary reputational rewards helped the reputation system to be informative. Finally, we found that high reputational scores are reinforced further as they are rewarded with positive messages, and positive gossip was leading to higher reputations.
Robert Somogyi will present his paper at the 14th Digital Economics conference of the Toulouse School of Economics, held online on January 7th.
Continue reading “Somogyi @ 14th TSE Digital Economics conference”
Imre Dobos received two publication awards from the Committee on Management Science (GTB) of Section IX of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS).
The committee grants awards in three categories: domestic Hungarian-language journal articles, international foreign-language journal articles and books. The Subcommittee on Management and Organizational Sciences of the GTB granted him the award in the books category for the publication of Trust research in business relations – A dyadic data analysis approach (In Hungarian; joint work with Andrea Gelei; Typotex Publishing House, Budapest, 2019).
Moreover, Imre received another award, granted by the GTB Subcommittee on Industrial and Business Economics in the category of foreign-language articles for publishing Inventory-related costs in green supplier selection problems with Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (joint with Vörösmarty, Gy.; International Journal of Production Economics, 209, 374-380.
Congratulations on his awards!
The paper “Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet” by Robert Somogyi (joint with Axel Gautier) has been published recently in the International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Click here for free access to the article until Nov 15th.
The authors compare two business practices on the mobile internet market, paid prioritization and zero-rating. These practices are tools for the internet service provider (ISP) to alter competition on the content market. Both violate the principle of net neutrality, but the paper shows that their effects on consumer welfare are fairly different. In particular, it finds that a policy banning prioritization (a policy currently followed by the EU and also the US until 2016) can lead to zero-rating (if allowed) and a reduction in consumer surplus. Finally, the paper also shows that despite the fears of net neutrality advocates about excluding lawful content, the ISP can extract more surplus from consumers by privileging the relatively weaker content, at least when asymmetry between content types is limited.
We are pleased to announce that Luca Sandrini joined the QSMS research group on Oct 1, 2020, as a Postdoctoral Researcher. He completed his Ph.D. in Economics and Management at the University of Padova, Italy under the supervision of Prof. Fabio Manenti in 2020. His research interests are Economics of Innovation, Industrial Organization, and Digital Economics.
We are pleased to announce that Noémie Cabau joined the QSMS research group on Sept 1, 2020, as a Postdoctoral Researcher. She completed her PhD in Economics at Paris Dauphine University, France, and Concordia University, Montreal, Canada in 2020. Her research interests are contract theory and network formation games.
The paper “Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples” by Fatma Aslan (joint with Jean Lainé) has been published recently in Journal of Mathematical Economics.
