September 20: Anastas Tenev (QSMS Seminar)

Anastas Tenev from the Institute of Economics at Corvinus University will present his paper “Information Design for Weighted Voting” (co-authored with Toygar T. Kerman) on September 20th at 10 AM, room QA405. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau ( and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (  

Abstract:  We consider a sender who wishes to persuade multiple receivers to vote in favor of a proposal and sends them correlated messages that are conditional on the true state of the world. The receivers share a common prior, wish to implement the outcome that matches the true state, and have homogeneous preferences, but are heterogeneous in their voting weights. Given a weight profile, an optimal signal can be represented by a tractable linear programming problem. We employ insights from cooperative game theory and interpret the voting problem as a simple game to analyze optimal communication for various voting situations. While public communication is optimal under weak, oligarchic, or dictatorial games, the sender can significantly benefit from private communication under symmetric, strong, or non-weak proper games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to analyze a weighted voting application of Bayesian persuasion.