June 16:  Rafael Treibich (QSMS Seminar)

Rafael Treibich   (University of Southern Denmark) will present his paper “Repeated Majority Voting (co-authored with A. Macé) on June 16th at 10:00 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

The theory of repeated games offers a compelling rationale for cooperation in a variety of environments. Yet, its consequences for collective decision-making have been largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and show how repetition may reduce the inefficiency of majority voting. In turn, this affects the comparison of majority rules, which may differ significantly relative to the static setting. The model provides a rationale for the use of supermajority rules, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committee voting. 

May 30:  Szilvia Papai (QSMS Seminar)

Szilvia Papai  (Concordia University) will present her paper “Fair Maximum Matching Under Dichotomous Preference (co-authored with Shahidul Islam) on May 30th at 2:30 PM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

In a many-to-one matching problem children have dichotomous preferences over daycares, and daycares have strict priorities over children. Given the limited enrolment capacity of daycares, the main objective is to find a matching mechanism that is fair for children (i.e., does not violate the daycare priorities) and maximizes the number of matched children. We identify a class of mechanisms that are fair and always lead to a maximum matching. We also show that these mechanisms are strategyproof for the children. 

March 24:  Anastasia Leontiou   (QSMS Recruitment Job Talk)

Anastasia Leontiou  (University of Ioannina) will present her job market paper “Tacit bundling among rivals: Limited availability bargains to loss-averse consumers (co-authored with N. Ziros) on March 24th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

The current paper addresses a mechanism that encourages the bundle consumption of two substitute goods in a partially differentiated duopoly. Assuming consumer loss aversion à la ‎Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), we develop a bait-and-switch model, where a seller offers a discount in limited availability to attract consumers’ interest and increase their willingness to pay when the discount is not available to avoid the disappointment of leaving the store empty-handed. Due to market competition, such stochastic pricing is effective only when it induces the joint purchase of the products and consumers end up buying both products. As a result, this bait-and-switch strategy creates conditions for collusion between the rival firms as they achieve bundle scheme sales at high component prices without any explicit agreement. Hence, our results shed light on bait-and-switch practices that might require additional, well-designed policies. 

March 20:  Héctor Hermida-Rivera   (QSMS Recruitment Job Talk)

Héctor Hermida-Rivera  (University of East Anglia) will present his job market paper “Stable Voting Rules on March 20th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

This paper introduces a flexible notion of stability for voting rules that can be used with any equilibrium concept. Theorem 1 shows that if players’ utility function satisfies four natural axioms, a voting rule is stable in Nash equilibria if and only if it has a unique minimal winning coalition. Theorem 2 shows that under the same four axioms, the set of stable voting rules in undominated Nash equilibria contains the set of voting rules with a unique minimal winning coalition and is contained in the set of voting rules with non-empty intersection of minimal winning coalitions. Finally, Theorems 3 to 6 rely on these results to partially characterise the set of self-stable constitutions, where a constitution is a pair of voting rules: an ordinary one for routine issues, and an extraordinary one for amendments.

March 10:  Maxim Senkov  (QSMS Recruitment Job Talk)

Maxim Senkov (CERGE-EI Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education – Economics Institute) will present his job market paper “Setting Interim Deadlines to Persuade on March 10th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the principal. If the project is sufficiently promising ex ante, then the agent commits to providing only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough ex ante, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good news but also the bad news that a project milestone has not been reached by an interim deadline. I demonstrate that the outlined structure of optimal information disclosure holds irrespective of the agent’s profit share, benefit from the flow of funding, and the common discount rate. 

March 7:  Andrei Kalk  (QSMS Seminar)

Andrei Kalk (University of Vienna) will present his paper “Environmental policy under political pressure  on March 7th at 10 AM, room QA 406. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov(samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

Climate change poses major challenges for governments around the world
because the transition from a traditional economy to a carbon-neutral
one must take place rapidly if tipping points are not to be exceeded. A
particularly important aspect of this transition is that it necessarily
creates economic winners and losers. Individual companies or entire
industries that are dependent on the use of fossil fuels lose part of
their business basis, while other industries benefit immensely from the
transition to CO2 neutrality. This situation creates a favorable
breeding ground for lobbying and other forms of political influence. The
present paper is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of this
problem. 

February 10:  Martin Obradovits  (QSMS Job Market Seminar)

Martin Obradovits (University of Innsbruck) will present his Job Market Paper “Competition with List Prices on February 10th at 10 AM, room QA 406 (note the room change). One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov(samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

Retail prices in stores are often lower than widely advertised list prices. We study the competitive role of such list prices in a homogeneous product duopoly where firms first set list prices before setting possibly reduced retail prices. Building on Varian (1980), we assume that some consumers observe no prices, some observe all prices, and some only observe the more salient list prices. We show that when the latter group chooses myopically, firms’ ability to use list prices lowers average transaction prices. This effect is weakened when these consumers are rational. The possibility to use list prices facilitates collusion. 

January 27:  Eleftheria Triviza  (QSMS Job Market Seminar)

Eleftheria Triviza (University of Mannheim) will present her Job Market Paper “Optimal Pricing Scheme for Addictive Goods on January 27th at 10 AM, room QA 406 (note the room change). One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov(samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

This article analyses how consumers’ habit formation and addiction affect firms’ pricing policies. I consider both sophisticated consumers, who realize that their current consumption will affect future tastes, and “naive” consumers, who do not. The optimal contract for sophisticated consumers is a two-part tariff. The main result is that the optimal pricing pattern when the consumer is naive is a “bargain then rip-off” contract, namely a fixed fee, with the first units priced below cost, and then priced above marginal cost. This holds both under symmetric and asymmetric information about the consumers’ degree of sophistication. 

January 17:  Philipp Külpmann  (QSMS Job Market Seminar)

Philipp Külpmann (University of Vienna) will be presenting his Job Market Paper “Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment  (co-authored with Davit Khantadze, ISET, Tbilisi State University) on January 19th at 10 AM, room QA 406 (note the room change). One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

We investigate the effect of the absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs. In our experiment, around 76% of the players chose the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9.33% of the players had first-order beliefs that led to coordination failure, and another 9.33% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. 

December 13:  Steven Kivinen  (QSMS Seminar)

Steven Kivinen (University of Graz) will be presenting his paper “On the Manipulability of Equitable Voting Rules  on December 13th at 10 AM, room QA 405. One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).  

Abstract:   

We consider the equity-manipulability trade-off when voting over two alternatives. Pairwise equity is a weakening of anonymity requiring certain permutations of the voters’ identities to preserve the outcome of the election. l-robust group strategy-proofness (l-RGSP) and fine robust group strategy-proofness (FRGSP) are notions of group strategy-proofness that allow voters to have different beliefs about players’ types (Kivinen and Tumennasan, 2021). Our main results show that, under mild conditions, for pairwise equitable voting rules anonymity is equivalent to 2-RGSP, 3-RGSP, and FRGSP. In this way, anonymity is special in its equity and non-manipulability. These results follow from several preliminary results, one of which equates 2-RGSP to comonotonicity and swap-robustness. Finally, we consider the manipulability of k-unanimous rules, and 2-RGSP when agents can be indifferent and abstain.