Szabó Márton Bence (QSMS) will present “Probing into War: How Limited Military Operations Increase the Risk of War” on March 30th, 2026, at 10:30 AM, in room QA323.
Abstract:
This article develops a formal model showing how an opponent can use limited military operations (LMOs) to infer a patron state’s resolve to defend its client in an all-out conflict, and how such probing can paradoxically increase the risk of war. Specifically, LMOs can generate an equilibrium in which the highly resolved patron perfectly distinguishes itself by offering high support, while moderately resolved and low-resolved patrons fail to fully separate. When the prior belief that the patron is highly resolved is sufficiently high, so that the opponent initially avoids risking conflict, an LMO can increase the likelihood of war by enabling the opponent to rule out the highly resolved patron while sharpening uncertainty about the remaining types. In this way, the model explains why limited military operations are sometimes followed by, rather than substituting for, large-scale wars.