The aim of Stody+games, the Meeting on Games, Stochastics, and Dynamics is to bring together researchers who work on mathematical questions related to stochastic and dynamic features of games and to facilitate discussions and collaborations on this area. The meeting will include several talks and a poster session.
László Á. Kóczy presented his paper Network Disruptions and the Security of Supply in the European Gas Network (joint with Balázs Sziklai and Dávid Csercsik) at the 20th Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Marseille, France on 21-25 June 2021.
The paper titled Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union discusses the impact of Brexit on voting in the Council of the European Union. There is a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases the largest members’ powers while decreasing the smallest ones’ powers.
László Á. Kóczy presented his paper Power and preferences (joint with Balázs Sziklai) at the PPE Conference on Social Choice and Voting Theory, hosted by the Kellog Centre for Philosophy, Politics and Economics, Virginia Tech on 17-19 June 2021.
In the paper titled The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games (co-authored with P. Jean-Jacques Herings) published in Games and Economic Behavior, the equivalence of two dynamic cooperative game theoretic concepts, the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set is studied and the modifications needed for equivalence are presented.
A human solution to the problem of cooperation is the maintenance of informal reputation hierarchies. Reputational information contributes to cooperation by providing guidelines about previous group-beneficial or free-rider behaviour in social dilemma interactions. How reputation information could be credible, however, remains a puzzle. We test two potential safeguards to ensure credibility: (i) reputation is a scarce resource and (ii) it is not earned for direct benefits. We test these solutions in a laboratory experiment in which participants played two-person Prisoner’s Dilemma games without partner selection, could observe some other interactions, and could communicate reputational information about possible opponents to each other. Reputational information clearly influenced cooperation decisions. Although cooperation was not sustained at a high level in any of the conditions, the possibility of exchanging third-party information was able to temporarily increase the level of strategic cooperation when reputation was a scarce resource and reputational scores were directly translated into monetary benefits. We found that competition for monetary rewards or unrestricted non-monetary reputational rewards helped the reputation system to be informative. Finally, we found that high reputational scores are reinforced further as they are rewarded with positive messages, and positive gossip was leading to higher reputations.
Imre Dobos received two publication awards from the Committee on Management Science (GTB) of Section IX of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS).
The committee grants awards in three categories: domestic Hungarian-language journal articles, international foreign-language journal articles and books. The Subcommittee on Management and Organizational Sciences of the GTB granted him the award in the books category for the publication of Trust research in business relations – A dyadic data analysis approach(In Hungarian; joint work with Andrea Gelei; Typotex Publishing House, Budapest, 2019).