Philipp Külpmann (University of Vienna) will be presenting his Job Market Paper “Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment “ (co-authored with Davit Khantadze, ISET, Tbilisi State University) on January 19th at 10 AM, room QA 406 (note the room change). One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. Noémie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).
Abstract:
We investigate the effect of the absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs. In our experiment, around 76% of the players chose the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9.33% of the players had first-order beliefs that led to coordination failure, and another 9.33% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs.