Presenting “Collective action on an endogenous network” at 12:15-13:30 in QA406.
PLEASE MIND OUR NEW VENUE FOR THIS YEAR!
On 4 March 2020, we have Noémie Cabau of Université Paris Dauphine visiting us. She is going to give a seminar on “Collective action on an endogenous network” at 12:15-13:30 in room A406 in Building Q, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Magyar tudósok körútja 2, 1117 Budapest. Sandwiches will be provided. Please help the organisers by registering in advance at email@example.com Registration is free.
Also, see our Facebook event.
Abstract: When an individual agent holds social-relevant information that is worthwhile sharing, how do non-cooperative agents coordinate to maximize the diffusion of the information? I present a model of network formation in an environment where agents balance their private costs of link formation against their social benefits. The social benefit from a link is assumed alternatively to depend on (i) the total number of agents the link allows to connect either directly or indirectly; or (ii) how close the link brings agents to each others. An agent’s payoff is equal to a reward common to all agents, and whose value depends on (i) the reach or (ii) the closeness of all agents, minus the cost he privately incurs for each link he initiates. This allows me to formulate the game as a non-cooperative game. When only the reach of the agents matter, the strict Nash networks are wheel networks that may or may not include all agents. When the closeness of the agents matter, the equilibrium networks have the architecture of a flower network or that of a disconnected variant of a flower network.