{"id":556,"date":"2019-01-18T12:00:06","date_gmt":"2019-01-18T12:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/qsms.mokk.bme.hu\/?p=556"},"modified":"2019-01-23T07:30:32","modified_gmt":"2019-01-23T07:30:32","slug":"1-feb-khai-zhi-sim-qsms-seminar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/2019\/01\/18\/1-feb-khai-zhi-sim-qsms-seminar\/","title":{"rendered":"1 Feb: Khai Zhi Sim (QSMS Seminar)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.khaizhisim.com\/\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright \" src=\"https:\/\/economics.cornell.edu\/sites\/econ\/files\/KhaiSim.png\" alt=\"Khai Zhi Sim\" width=\"193\" height=\"220\" \/><\/a>Presenting <em>Bank Bailouts: Cost of Inability to Commit\u00a0<\/em>at 12:15-13:30 in QA406.<!--more--><span id=\"more-538\"><\/span><\/p>\n<p>On 1st February 2019 we have <a href=\"https:\/\/www.khaizhisim.com\/\">Khai Zhi Sim<\/a> of Cornell University visiting us. He is going to give a seminar titled <a href=\"https:\/\/drive.google.com\/file\/d\/1Wc0BfP_kdILbq1GFxW-o3rVOwTr5Vn1c\/view\"><em>Bank Bailouts: Cost of Inability to Commit<\/em><\/a>\u00a0at 12:15-13:30 in room A406\u00a0 in Building Q,\u00a0Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Magyar tud\u00f3sok k\u00f6r\u00fatja 2, 1117 Budapest.\u00a0Sandwiches will be provided. Please <a href=\"https:\/\/goo.gl\/forms\/8eVGDSidlpzHrtq13\"><strong>register<\/strong>.<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Abstract: I develop a theoretical model to investigate the failure to commit in the provision of bailouts to financial institutions. When financial institutions fail, the fiscal authority often deviates from the ex-ante no-bailout commitment as the ex-post best response is bailout. The fiscal authority\u2019s time inconsistency creates moral hazard. I analyze the welfare loss from the failure to commit. In the model, as long as the fiscal authority is able to commit to a pre-determined bailout policy, the outcome is typically constrained efficient. Furthermore, a higher probability of bank run is not always welfare reducing. Increased run probability can be beneficial by making financial institutions more cautious, thus decreasing moral hazard loss. Regulations on short-term interest rates offered by financial institutions can also effectively deter moral hazard, particularly when the run probability is small.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Presenting Bank Bailouts: Cost of Inability to Commit\u00a0at 12:15-13:30 in QA406.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[22,4,17],"tags":[69,68],"class_list":["post-556","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-event","category-news","category-seminar","tag-bank-bailouts","tag-khai-zhi-sim"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/556","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=556"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/556\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":577,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/556\/revisions\/577"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=556"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=556"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=556"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}