{"id":1876,"date":"2025-04-10T06:20:36","date_gmt":"2025-04-10T06:20:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/?p=1876"},"modified":"2025-04-10T06:20:36","modified_gmt":"2025-04-10T06:20:36","slug":"april-14-ina-taneva-qsms-seminar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/2025\/04\/10\/april-14-ina-taneva-qsms-seminar\/","title":{"rendered":"April 14: Ina Taneva (QSMS Seminar)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Ina Taneva (University of Edinburgh) will present <em>&#8220;Strategic Ignorance and Information Design&#8221;<\/em> (with Tom Wiseman) on April 14th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Abstract:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly refuse to view their private signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to view their signals may lead to substantial divergence between the designer\u2019s intent and actual outcomes, even in the case where the designer seeks to maximize the agents&#8217; payoffs. We introduce the appropriate equilibrium concept \u2014 ignorance-permissive Bayes correlated equilibrium \u2014 and characterize implementable distributions over states and actions. The designer\u2019s optimal response to strategic ignorance generates qualitative properties that standard information design cannot: the designer may provide redundant or even counterproductive information, asymmetric information structures may be strictly optimal in symmetric environments, providing information conditional on players\u2019 viewing choices rather than all at once may hurt the designer, and communication between players may help her. Optimality sometimes requires that players ignore their signals with positive probability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ina Taneva (University of Edinburgh) will present &#8220;Strategic Ignorance and Information Design&#8221; (with Tom Wiseman) on April 14th, 2025, at 10:30 AM, in room QA405. Abstract: We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly refuse to view their private signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to view their signals &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/2025\/04\/10\/april-14-ina-taneva-qsms-seminar\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;April 14: Ina Taneva (QSMS Seminar)&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[22,4,17],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1876","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-event","category-news","category-seminar"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1876","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1876"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1876\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1877,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1876\/revisions\/1877"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1876"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1876"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1876"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}