{"id":1722,"date":"2024-02-13T12:56:05","date_gmt":"2024-02-13T12:56:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/?p=1722"},"modified":"2024-02-13T12:56:05","modified_gmt":"2024-02-13T12:56:05","slug":"february-19-noemie-cabau-qsms-seminar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/2024\/02\/13\/february-19-noemie-cabau-qsms-seminar\/","title":{"rendered":"February 19: Noemie Cabau (QSMS Seminar)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Noemie Cabau\u00a0 (Co-author: Arseniy Samsonov) will present their paper &#8220;<em>Signaling Effort: Information Structures in a Principal-Agent model<\/em>&#8221; on February 19th at 10:00 AM, room QA405.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Abstract:&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We propose a principal-agent model with moral hazard and non-contractible output where the agent can design a signal about his effort. If there is no signal besides the agent&#8217;s, the latter appropriates the first best surplus in every equilibrium. If there is an external signal, the principal can offer a default contract conditioned on it. The agent&#8217;s incentive to provide further information stems from the trade-off between lowering the expected punishment and decreasing the expected reward. We show that the agent&#8217;s equilibrium signal is informative if he faces a severe and likely punishment under the default contract. We find that the agent benefits from correlating his signal to the outside one and that a more precise external signal may not benefit the principal.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Noemie Cabau\u00a0 (Co-author: Arseniy Samsonov) will present their paper &#8220;Signaling Effort: Information Structures in a Principal-Agent model&#8221; on February 19th at 10:00 AM, room QA405. Abstract:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; We propose a principal-agent model with moral hazard and non-contractible output where the agent can design a signal about his effort. If there is no signal besides the agent&#8217;s, &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/2024\/02\/13\/february-19-noemie-cabau-qsms-seminar\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;February 19: Noemie Cabau (QSMS Seminar)&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":15,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[22,4,17],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1722","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-event","category-news","category-seminar"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1722","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/15"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1722"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1722\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1723,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1722\/revisions\/1723"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1722"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1722"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1722"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}