{"id":1418,"date":"2022-10-13T09:01:57","date_gmt":"2022-10-13T09:01:57","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/?p=1418"},"modified":"2022-10-13T09:01:57","modified_gmt":"2022-10-13T09:01:57","slug":"october-18-ryan-tierney-qsms-seminar","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/2022\/10\/13\/october-18-ryan-tierney-qsms-seminar\/","title":{"rendered":"October 18: Ryan Tierney (QSMS Seminar)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Ryan Tierney <\/strong>from the University of Southern Denmark will be presenting his paper “Crowding in School Choice<\/em>“<\/em> on October 18th at 10 AM, room QA405.\u00a0One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. No\u00e9mie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu<\/a>) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu<\/a>).\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abstract:\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents’ decision making and the empirical literature; however, they cause major difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature—the Rural Hospitals Theorem, welfare lattice, etc.—survive.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ryan Tierney from the University of Southern Denmark will be presenting his paper “Crowding in School Choice“ on October 18th at 10 AM, room QA405.\u00a0One-to-one meetings with the speaker can be arranged; please contact the seminar organizers, Dr. No\u00e9mie Cabau (cabau.noemie@gtk.bme.hu) and Dr. Arseniy Samsonov (samsonov.arseniy@gtk.bme.hu).\u00a0\u00a0 Abstract:\u00a0\u00a0We consider the market design problem of matching students … Continue reading “October 18: Ryan Tierney (QSMS Seminar)”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[22,4,17],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1418","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-event","category-news","category-seminar"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1418","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1418"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1418\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1420,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1418\/revisions\/1420"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1418"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1418"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/qsms.bme.hu\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1418"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}