

## Arseniy Samsonov

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### Employment

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2021 Postdoctoral researcher, Budapest University of Technology and Economics,  
Quantitative Social and Management Science Research Group

### Education

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2021 University of California, Los Angeles  
*Ph.D. in Political Science, June 2021*

References: Michael Chwe (chair), Barry O'Neill, Daniel Treisman

2015 Joint Baccalaureate of Higher School of Economics and New Economic School  
*Bachelor of Arts in Economics*

### Teaching

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2021 Teaching Assistant: Arms Control and International Security, UCLA. Lecturer: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in International Studies, RANEP.

2020 Instructor, "Comparative Politics", Department of Political Science, The Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. Instructor, "Political Economics", Department of Economics, Moscow State University. Teaching Assistant: "Political Economy of Climate Change", UCLA.

2019 Instructor, "Quantitative Methods in Political Science", Department of Political Science, The Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. Teaching Assistant, "Public Economics", Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics.

2016-2019 Teaching Assistant, "Politics and Strategy", "World Politics", "International Political Economy", "Arms Control and International Security", Department of Political Science, UCLA.

2015 Teaching Assistant, "Game Theory", Department of Political Science, Higher School of Economics.

### Research Interests

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Political Economy

Game Theory

### Publications

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2021 "The fragmentation of views in a democracy" - "Economics of Governance"

**Abstract:** Are voters in democracies more competent if there are more media outlets? To answer this question, I provide a game-theoretic model of media capture and political persuasion in democratic countries. In the model, there are two politicians, the Incumbent and the Challenger. They co-opt the media by offering them access to information. In exchange, the media support politicians who are available for interviews or include journalists in press pools. Voters choose like-minded media. I show that if the Incumbent is sufficiently popular and has little policy information, then media bias in her favor weakly increases in the number of media outlets. Otherwise, media bias in the Incumbent's favor weakly decreases in the number of media outlets. The welfare of voters weakly increases and decreases in the respective cases. The intuition is that, in equilibrium, the Incumbent can co-opt only one media outlet and ensure that enough voters read it. In this case, media outlets compete for access to the Incumbent and agree for a higher bias as their number increases.

## Working papers

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2021 "Can social media limit disinformation?"

**Abstract:** Political fake news is dangerous for democracies. Social and government pressure made Facebook and Twitter start labeling posts that contain disinformation. This policy became known as fact-checking. Often a government can not regulate all social media platforms. For instance, the U.S. government can regulate Facebook and Twitter, but not the international Telegram or the Indian Koo. Will making some but not all platforms fact-check increase the probability that voters make the best choice for themselves? If there is no regulation, will social media platforms fact-check? I propose a game-theoretic model in which two platforms decide whether to fact-check a politician. One of the platforms is ex-ante more attractive to voters than the other. The politician chooses which of the platforms to use for communicating with voters and how often to misrepresent the state of the world if it is bad for her. Making the ex-ante more attractive platform fact-check increases the probability that voters make the best choice given the state of the world. If the politician has a low approval, her policy is unlikely to succeed, or one of the platforms is much more ex-ante attractive, then each platform will choose to fact-check without regulation. Otherwise, neither platform will choose to fact-check.

2018 "Minorities in dictatorship and democracy", available as APSA preprint

**Abstract:** How does the level of democracy in a country affect the government's treatment of ethnic minorities? I find that, on average, when the largest ethnic group in a society exceeds half of the population, ethnic minorities are treated better in autocracies and full democracies than in semi-democratic countries. The intuition is that under autocracy a leader needs little popular support, and therefore a coalition of several minorities can rule. By contrast, in a semi-democracy, the leader needs the support of more people, so a coalition of small ethnic groups is insufficient; the largest group is enough and no other groups are necessary. Finally, highly democratic countries require broad support, and most ethnic groups get benefits. My model is based on the Baron-Ferejohn bargaining game and my empirical tests use the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.

## Presentations

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2021 Nazarbayev University (online), Budapest University of Technology (online), Masaryk University (online), ICSID Conference at the Higher School of Economics (online)

- 2020 Bar-Ilan University Ph.D. workshop (Ramat-Gan), Higher School of Economics International Center for Economics and Finance (Moscow, online), Higher School of Economics Game Theory Lab Seminar (Saint Petersburg, online), April Conference at the Higher School of Economics (online), Kyiv School of Economics (online), University of California, Irvine Ph.D. workshop (online), Higher School of Economics (Saint Petersburg, online), Johannes Kepler University Linz (online), Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (online), European University (Saint Petersburg, online), American Political Science Association (online), APSA Virtual Formal Theory Seminar (online)
- 2019 Moscow State University, Higher School of Economics (Moscow), Higher School of Economics (Saint Petersburg), International Meeting on Game Theory (Saint Petersburg), Conference on Economic Design (Budapest), Proseminar in Economic Theory at the University of California, Los Angeles.
- 2018 Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago).

### **Workshop Participation**

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- 2020 Dynamics and Information Workshop, Tel Aviv University.
- 2017 28th Summer School in Economic Theory, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

### **Honors and Awards**

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- 2020 Hayek Fund for Scholars
- 2018-2019 Conference travel grants, UCLA
- 2017-2019 Institute of Humane Studies Ph.D. Fellowship
- 2016 Institute of Humane Studies Ph.D. Scholarship
- 2016 Graduate Dean Scholarship at UCLA
- 2011 All-Russian Olympiad in Economics, 2nd degree diploma, HSE Olympiad in Economics, 1st degree diploma

### **Service**

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- 2020 Referee for the American Journal of Political Science.
- 2017 Helped to conduct a survey of participants at the Women's March in Los Angeles.
- 2013 – 2016 Taught Economics and Game Theory at Winter and Summer Schools.

### **Computer skills**

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STATA

Mathematica

Python

## Languages

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English (fluent)

Russian (native)

## Personal

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Birth date: 09.11.1994

Citizenship: Russia